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I. INTRODUCTION
According to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), an estimated sixty million people in America do not
possess adequate access to banking services.' As a result, these
individuals tend to use "usurious check cashers, payday lenders
and pawnbrokers" to satisfy their financial needs.2 In 2009, 26% of
U.S. households had inadequate or no access to banking services,
and 71% of those that lacked access earned less than $30,000
annually. The number of underbanked4 or unbanked households
was significantly higher among minority populations: 54% of black
households and 43% of Hispanic households were unbanked or
underbanked in 2009.' What is even more concerning is the
increase in the number of individuals without adequate financial
1. See Sara Lepro, New Face of the Underbanked Consumer, AM. BANKER, June
10, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 11766424 (Westlaw).
2. Rolfe Winkler et al., Halls of Finance Fear Wal-Mart, N.Y. TIMES, June 24,
2010, at B2; see also FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF
UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS 12 (2009) [hereinafter FED. DEPOSIT
INS. CORP., FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED
HOUSEHOLDS], available at http://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/full-report.pdf
(maintaining that respondents who used check cashing and money orders cited the
convenience, speed and cost as the reasons they used these services).
3. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND
UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS, supra note 2, at 11; see also Bob Koslow, Banking on
It: Wal-Mart Offers Savings While Cashing Checks, Paying Bills and Transferring
Money, DAYTONA NEWS-J., Apr. 18, 2010, at D1 ("Sixteen states have underbanked
household rates above 20 percent. Alaska is the highest with a 25.5 percent
underbanked rate followed by Mississippi, 25.2; South Carolina, 24.2; Texas, 24.1; and
Washington, D.C., 23.9.").
4. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND
UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS, supra note 2, at 10 n.6 ("Underbanked households are
defined as those that have a checking or savings account but rely on alternative
financial services. Specifically, underbanked households have used non-bank money
orders, non-bank check-cashing services, payday loans, rent-to-own agreements, or
pawn shops at least once or twice a year or refund anticipation loans at least once in
the past five years.").
5. Id. at 11.
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
services as well as the recent demographic shift within this
6category. For example, more members of the traditional middle-
class lack access to banking largely because of the poor economy.
Further, from 2005 to 2009, payday lender Advance America Cash
Advance Centers Inc. (Advance America) observed the average
age of its customers increase from thirty-nine years of age to forty-
eight and the median household income increase from $40,557 to
$50,000.8 Also, homeowners encompassed 69% of Advance
America's business in 2009, up from 45% in 2005, and 91% of its
customers were high school graduates, up from 86% in 2005.9
The underbanked and unbanked constitute only a fraction
of the population in need of cost-efficient financial services.1o
Customers currently using traditional banks are increasingly
searching for inexpensive, dependable alternatives." According to
a 2010 J.D. Power and Associates satisfaction survey, among
individuals who had access to financial services, only thirty-four
percent of respondents were certain they would remain loyal to
their banks over the course of twelve months.12 Some observers
suggest that this trend is due, in part, to a growing perception of
banks as more concerned with increasing profits than providing
good services." Others argue that customers are simply more
sensitive to the cost of banking, and are increasingly willing to
switch to cheaper suppliers that provide better customer service.14
However, experts expect the number of banks in the United States
to decrease from more than 7,000 in 2010 to an estimated 4,300 by
2015," and as a consequence, Americans will find it more difficult




10. See Financial Services on Aisle Nine: Wal-Mart Gives Banks a Run for Their
Money, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Sept. 1, 2010),
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edularticle.cfm?articleid=2583.
11. Id.
12. J.D. POWER & Assocs., 2010 RETAIL BANKING SATISFACTION STUDY (2010),
http://www.jdpower.com/finance/articles/2010-Retail-Banking-Satisfaction-Study/.
13. See id. (citing poor customer service and high bank fees as the most common
reasons people switched banks).
14. See id.
15. OLIVER WYMAN, STATE OF THE FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY 2010 32
(2010) (on file with author).
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to gain access to financial institutions that offer quality services at
a reasonably-low cost.1
With $405 billion in revenues and more than 200 million
shoppers per week,'7 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Wal-Mart) is well
positioned to take advantage of the increasing demand for low-
cost financial services.18 Although Wal-Mart has failed to acquire
a bank charter on several occasions, the mega-retailer has taken
innovative steps to offer financial services without a charter.1 9
However, in the summer of 2010, Congress included provisions in
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (Dodd-Frank)20 prohibiting certain commercial entities from
21acquiring any sort of bank charter for at least three years.
Because of Dodd-Frank, Wal-Mart cannot currently provide
traditional banking services.22 Nevertheless, Wal-Mart
continuously finds alternative means to increase its market share
in the industry23 and provide financial services to financially
underserved citizens that local, community banks are unable or
unwilling to provide.24 When Dodd-Frank's moratorium expires in
2013, Congress should permit Wal-Mart to utilize an Industrial
Loan Company (ILC) 2' as long as the retailer and the ILC
16. See Financial Services on Aisle Nine: Wal-Mart Gives Banks a Run for Their
Money, supra note 10.
17. About Us, WAL-MART, http://walmartstores.com/AboutUs/ (last visited Jan.
14, 2011).
18. See, e.g., John Engen, Wal-Mart Gets Serious, U.S. BANKER, Sept. 1, 2010,
available at 2010 WLNR 17407972 (noting that many of the underbanked and
unbanked populations fall within demographics that Wal-Mart currently targets).
19. See Financial Services on Aisle Nine: Wal-Mart Gives Banks a Run for Their
Money, supra note 10.
20. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
21. Id. § 603 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1815 note).
22. See John L. Ropiequet et al., An Introduction to the Dodd-Frank Act-The
New Regulatory Structure For Consumer Finance Emerges, 29 No. 8 BANKING & FIN.
SERVICES POL'Y REP. 1, 1,7 (2010).
23. See, e.g., Engen, supra note 18.
24. See Financial Services on Aisle Nine: Wal-Mart Gives Banks a Run for Their
Money, supra note 10.
25. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(H) (2006) (excluding ILCs from the definition of a
bank); MELANIE L. FEIN, SECURITIES ACrIVITIES OF BANKS § 2.01(J)(7) (3d ed. 2001
& Supp. 2011) (explaining that ILCs are entities, chartered by a small number of
states, with bank-like qualities and flexible financial powers, including the power to
make certain consumer and commercial loans).
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maintain an arm's-length relationship that is monitored by an
FDIC equipped with the authority to enforce current banking laws
*26more strictly.
The purpose of this Note is to review Wal-Mart's efforts to
enter the financial services industry, and to discuss why Congress
should reconsider its resistance towards Wal-Mart's financial
advance. Part II will chronicle actions taken by Wal-Mart over the
last fifteen years to acquire or establish a banking charter, discuss
regulatory and legislative responses to those endeavors, and
explore the underlying motives for the negative scrutiny. 27 Part III
will assess the effects of Dodd-Frank on this mega-retailer's
banking aspirations." Part IV will examine the current state of
Wal-Mart's financial capabilities as well as the economic benefits
associated with its financial expansion.2 9 In Part V, the Note will
discuss why Congress should not eliminate the ILC exception, but
instead, permit Wal-Mart to reapply and proceed with its
application for a limited bank charter.30 Finally, in Part VI, the
Note concludes that Congress should enact legislation permitting
Wal-Mart to acquire or establish an ILC."
II. WAL-MART'S PRIOR ATrEMPTS
The primary argument against permitting Wal-Mart to
operate a bank is the long-held prohibition against mixing
commerce and banking.32 However, as is the case with most rules,
there have been exceptions. The existence of entities
26. See Lawrence J. White, Should Wal-Mart, Real Estate Brokers, and Banks Be
in Bed Together? A Principles-Based Approach to the Issues of the Separation of
Banking and Commerce 7 (N.Y. Univ. Stern Sch. of Bus., Working Paper EC-07-21,
2007), available at http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/emplibrary/7-21.pdf.
27. See infra Part II.
28. See infra Part III.
29. See infra Part IV.
30. See infra Part V.
31. See infra Part VI.
32. See, e.g., Zachariah J. Lloyd, Note, Waging War with Wal-Mart: A Cry for
Charge Threatens the Future of Industrial Loan Corporations, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP.
& FIN. L. 211, 224-235 (2008).
33. See, e.g., Joseph G. Haubrich & Joio A. C. Santos, Alternative Forms of
Mixing Banking with Commerce: Evidence from American History, 12 FIN. MARKETS,




concurrently engaged in both commercial endeavors and activities
associated with traditional financial institutions demonstrates an
absence of strict separation. A commercial company's ownership
or control of a single thrift35 is an example of an arrangement used
by commercial companies to acquire banking powers.36
A. Wal-Mart's Application for a Unitary Thrift Holding Company
In 1967, Congress passed the Savings and Loan Holding
Company Act (SLHCA), which, among other things, prohibited
companies that held more than a single thrift "from engaging in
nonbanking activities, as well as certain financial activities such as
underwriting insurance and securities."" But, this statute failed to
subject unitary thrift holding companies (owning only a single
thrift institution) to restrictions prohibiting nonbanking activities,
as long as the activity "did not pose a safety and soundness risk to
the thrift subsidiary." 8 Thus, the SLHCA did not restrict unitary
thrift holding companies to the nonbanking activities described in
the Act.39  Gradually, more nonbanking companies, including
securities firms, commercial retailers, and insurance companies
became unitary thrift holding companies to provide insured
deposits and other traditional banking services to their
customers." Simultaneously, traditional banking entities, namely
community banks, persistently voiced their hostility towards the
SLHCA's nonbanking activities exception for unitary thrift
34. See generally id. at 147 (reviewing the development of the "nonbank bank"
loophole, the circumstances that led to the passing of the Competitive Equality
Banking Act of 1987, and the redefinition of banks to include an institution that is
either insured by the FDIC or offers demand deposits and makes commercial loans).
35. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(i) (2006) (defining a thrift).
36. See Haubrich & Santos, supra note 33, at 122 ("In general, there are at least
five different possibilities . . . for mixing banking with commerce: (1) a bank owns a
firm; (2) a bank controls a firm; (3) a firm owns (or controls) a bank; (4) a person
controls both a bank and a firm; and (5) a holding company controls both a bank and
a firm.").
37. Id. at 151.
38. Id.
39. See JULIE L. WILLIAMS & SCOT ZESCH, SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS: MERGERS,
ACQUISITIONS AND CONVERSION § 2.01(5) (2010), available at SAVIMA § 2.01
(Westlaw).
40. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Wal-Mart and the Separation of Banking and
Commerce, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1539, 1585 (2007).
2011] 397
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
holding companies. 4 1 Under these conditions, Wal-Mart made its
first major attempt to enter the financial industry.42
In June of 1999, Wal-Mart filed an application with the
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) to acquire a thrift charter in
Oklahoma using the so called "unitary thrift loophole."4  Wal-
Mart's thrift application triggered intense uproar on the part of
community banks and others within the financial industry," who
feared that Wal-Mart would "invade bankers' turf and steal their
customers" if permitted to operate a thrift.4 5  Congress
subsequently took action to close the unitary thrift loophole in the
form of amendments to the SLHCA, included in the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), which subjected unitary thrift holding
companies to the same restrictions on nonbanking activities as
multiple thrift holding companies.46 In addition, Congress
permitted unitary thrift holding institutions that existed before
May 4, 1999 as well as those that applied with the OTS for a
unitary thrift holding charter before May 4, 1999 to be
"grandfathered," or to continue "to be free of restrictions on the
types of activities [the institution] may conduct." 47  Congress
further excluded unitary thrift holding companies involved in
inherently financial activities from restrictions imposed on
institutions carrying out commercial or industrial activities.4 Thus,
although Congress still permits various financial institutions to
operate thrifts, Wal-Mart, applying a month after the cut-off date,49
41. See Daniel O'Rourke, Surprise-Surprise: Wal-Mart Wants a Bank, MONDAQ,
Aug. 22, 2002, available at 2002 WLNR 8947275.
42. See id.
43. See Alan Kline, Community Bankers Hail the Defeat of Unitary Thrifts -- and
Wal-Mart, AM. BANKER, Oct. 26, 1999, available at 1999 WLNR 2773897 (Westlaw).
44. See id.
45. Kline, supra note 43 (noting that it was generally recognized that the GLBA
would open up banking to commerce by allowing more banks, insurance companies,
and brokerage houses into each other's businesses).
46. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(c)(9)(A) (2006); Rob Blackwell, Wal-Mart, TD: Could
They Make It Work?, AM. BANKER, Jan. 3, 2002, available at 2002 WLNR 3120690
(Westlaw).
47. WILLIAMS & ZESCH, supra note 39; see also Lawrence J. White, The Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act of 1999: A Bridge Too Far? Or Not Far Enough? 43 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 937, 943 (2010).
48. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(c)(9)(A).
49. Although the OTS maintained that it would continue considering Wal-Mart's
application until the GLBA became law on November 12, 1999, some suggest
[Vol. 15398
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continues to be prohibited from acquiring a thrift due to the
commercial nature of its operations.o
B. Wal-Mart's Attempts to Acquire an Industrial Loan Company
Charter
Another tool used by nonbanking, nonfinancial companies
to provide traditional banking services is an ILC." ILCs "are
state-charted organizations that have bank-like characteristics and
flexible powers," including the power to make certain consumer
and commercial loans.52 Additionally, the FDIC, their federal
regulator, may insure ILC deposits, but the state where it is
chartered is the primary regulator. Only seven states permit
companies to charter ILCs, but most ILCs are headquartered in
California and Utah.5 4 In order to be excluded from the definition
of a "bank" under the Banking Holding Companies Act
(BHCA)," the ILC must either not accept demand deposits or
limit its total assets to less than $100 million.56 A company that
Congress included the amendments to the SLHCA in the GLBA and selected the
May, 1999, cut-off partially to prevent Wal-Mart, who applied for a thrift in June,
1999, from operating a thrift. See Lloyd, supra note 32, at 224 n.93.
50. See Michele Heller, ILC Debate Heating Up, Wal-Mart Application, GAO
Study Provide Fuel, AM. BANKER, Aug. 30, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 13911583
(Westlaw).
51. See FEIN, supra note 25.
52. Id.
53. WILLIAM D. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32767, INDUSTRIAL LOAN
COMPANIES/BANKS AND THE SEPARATION OF BANKING AND COMMERCE:
LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY PERSPECTIVES 1 (2005) [hereinafter JACKSON RL
32767], available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL32767-20050627.pdf.
54. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Advisory Committee on Banking Policy: Industrial
Loan Companies (ILCs),
http://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/advisorycommittee/ilc060204.html (last updated Feb.
26, 2009) [hereinafter Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Advisory Committee on Banking
Policy] (stating that among the states that permit ILCs to be chartered include
Colorado, California, Hawaii, Indiana, Minnesota, Nevada and Utah).
55. See Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S.
361, 363 (1986) (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (2006)) ("Section 2(c) of the Banking
Holding Company Act defines 'bank' as any institution 'which (1) accepts deposits
that the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand, and (2) engages in the
business of making commercial loans.").
56. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(H); Edward D. Herlihy et al., Financial Institution
M&A 2009: Convergence, Consolidation, Consternation and Complexity in an
Industry in Transition an Annual Review of Leading Developments, in PRACTICING
LAW INSTITUTE, A GUIDE TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 2010: NAVIGATING THE NEW
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controls an ILC does not control a "bank" as defined in the
BHCA, and is not subject to restrictions on nonbanking activities.57
Thus, a nonfinancial, commercial company such as Wal-Mart may
acquire or establish a bank charter by acquiring an ILC.
ILCs are remnants of twentieth-century methods of
financing industrial enterprises. 9 Industrial companies used the
ILCs to satisfy their borrowing demands, which traditional banks
were unable to satisfy at the time.60 In 1958, the FDIC began to
insure a few ILCs,6 1 and in 1988, the agency expanded its financial
safety net to insure all large ILCs "operating safely." 6 2
Many nonfinancial institutions use ILCs to provide
traditional banking services without subjecting themselves to
BHCA restrictions on the sorts of nonbanking activities that they
may undertake.63  Moreover, because an ILC's controlling
shareholder is not subject to the BHCA, companies that own ILCs
are not subject to Federal Reserve Board (the Fed) supervision.
But, the ILCs themselves are subject to federal regulation in the
same manner and to the same extent as state nonmember banks.
In 2009, fifty-six FDIC-insured ILCs existed in the United States.6 6
Sears, Volvo, Toyota, and GE Capital are among the companies
LANDSCAPE 267,579-81 (2010), available at 1800 PLI/Corp 267 (Westlaw); Mindy
West, The FDIC's Supervision of Industrial Loan Companies: A Historical
Perspective, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/sisum04/industrial
loans.html (last updated June 25, 2004) (noting that an Industrial Loan Company
may avoid regulation as a bank if control of the institution was not acquired by any
company after August 10, 1987).
57. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(H).
58. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Advisory Committee on Banking Policy, supra
note 54 (outlining the powers, advantages and limits of ILCs).
59. JACKSON RL 32767, supra note 53, at 6; see also West, supra note 56
(explaining that the first ILC was established in 1910 in Norfolk, Virginia by Arthur
J. Morris, and Morris called it the Fidelity Savings and Trust Company of Norfolk,
Virginia).
60. See JACKSON RL 32767, supra note 53, at 7.
61. See West, supra note 56.
62. See JACKSON RL 32767, supra note 53, at 7.
63. See FEIN, supra note 25.
64. See West, supra note 56.
65. Ed Royce & Jim Matheson, Congress Shouldn't Shackle Industrial Loan
Companies, AM. BANKER, May 16, 2003, available at 2003 WLNR 4174995 (Westlaw).




that hold ILCs. 7 Two former investment firms, Goldman Sachs
and Morgan Stanley owned ILCs prior to the 2008 financial
collapse, but converted their ILC charters to bank charters in
September 2008.6 These investment firms found it necessary to
convert their ILC charters in order to subject themselves to
oversight by the Fed under the BHCA, which was necessary to
reassure investors during this unstable period.69 The firms also
wanted to participate in the Treasury's Troubled Asset Relief
Program (TARP).o
ILCs may offer several financial services, including demand
deposits, if the ILC has less than $100 million in assets" and
negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts, which function
like checking accounts,72 without subjecting the holding company
to nonbanking limitations under the BHCA." However, included
among an ILC's deficiencies are its inability to offer traditional
checking accounts, lack of branching powers, and its inability to
exploit federal preemption of state laws.74
In 2002, Wal-Mart attempted to acquire a California-
chartered ILC named Franklin Bank, but opponents in California
and within Congress immediately objected to the potential mix of
67. FEIN,supra note 25.
68. Because financial circumstances were unusual and exigent, the Fed quickly
approved Goldman Sach's and Morgan Stanley's bank applications after the Fed
determined that the investment firms and their subsidiaries were adequately
capitalized, their CRA ratings were "satisfactory" and "outstanding" respectively,
and their nonbank activities were "financial in nature" as required by section 4(k) of
the BHCA. See Order Approving Formation of Bank Holding Companies, 94 FED.
RES. BULL. C101, C102-103 (2008), available at 2008 WL 7861871; Id. C103, C104-106
(2008), available at 2008 WL 7861872.
69. See Steven Sloan, Reviving The Banking-Commerce Debate, AM. BANKER,
Nov. 21, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 22185695 (Westlaw).
70. Id.; see also Alexander C. Hart, Warning on TARP Funds: The Treasury is
Unlikely to be Repaid All of the Money Lent Under the Program, the Inspector
General Says, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 18915577
(maintaining that the goal of TARP was to stabilize the economy by purging banks'
balance sheets of toxic assets, and noting that Goldman Sachs received more than $10
billion in TARP funds, which it quickly repaid).
71. West, supra note 56.
72. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361,
363, 368 (1986) (observing that NOW accounts have qualities that are similar to
traditional checking accounts, but because they require prior notice before withdraw,
they do not afford depositors a legal right to withdraw on demand).
73. Id. at 363, 367 (1986); Herlihy et al., supra note 56, at 579.
74. Herlihy et al., supra note 56, at 582.
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banking and commerce. California subsequently passed
legislation prohibiting nonfinancial institutions from acquiring or
establishing state-chartered industrial banks unless the acquiring
companies were "engaged only in the activities permitted for
financial holding companies, as provided in . . . the federal
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act . ,,76 Due to Wal-Mart's extensive
retailing operations,n this restriction removed any possibility of
the mega-retailer gaining a charter in California. However, no
such restriction existed in the state of Utah.
In July 2005, Wal-Mart filed an application with the Utah
Department of Financial Institutions to charter an ILC in Utah,
and simultaneously applied for Federal Deposit Insurance with the
FDIC.8 According to Wal-Mart, its primary purpose in acquiring
an ILC was to promote greater efficiency and effectiveness in its
credit, debit, and electronic check transactions, which was
projected to save it more than $700 million annually.81 Wal-Mart's
application provoked significant backlash from various
82
representatives of the banking industry. According to one report,
bank officials and watchdog organizations sent 1,500 letters to the
FDIC "protesting Wal-Mart's banking charter application."8 1
Ultimately, Congress held hearings on the issue of whether to
continue excluding parent companies of ILCs from the BHCA's
restrictions on nonbanking activities.84 In addition, the House of
Representatives introduced and passed legislation that would
75. See Thomas J. Bliley, Jr., A Wal-Mart-Owned Bank Would Set Bad Precedent,
AM. BANKER, Aug. 16, 2002, available at 2002 WLNR 3161504 (Westlaw).
76. Cal. Fin. Code § 701.1 (West 2009).
77. About Us, supra note 17.
78. See FEIN,supra note 25.
79. See Steven Oberbeck, Wal-Mart Applies to Launch a Bank in Utah, SALT
LAKE TRIB., July 19, 2005, 2005 WLNR 11298039 (Westlaw).
80. See Application for Deposit Insurance for Wal-Mart Bank, 71 Fed. Reg.
10,531, 10,532 (Mar. 1, 2006).
81. See Engen, supra note 18.
82. Financial Services on Aisle Nine: Wal-Mart Gives Banks a Run for Their
Money, supra note 10.
83. Id. (referencing a CNN report from 2005).
84. See generally ILC's-A Review of Charter, Ownership, and Supervision
Issues: Hearing Before the H. Fin. Serv. Subcomm. on Fin. Institutions and Consumer




"limit ownership of ILCs by commercial companies . . . ."85
Although the legislation ultimately failed,6 the FDIC subsequently
issued a six-month moratorium preventing certain commercial
companies from acquiring an ILC,8 which was later extended
another year.88 Due to the intense scrutiny surrounding Wal-
Mart's attempt to acquire a bank charter and the FDIC's
institution of the moratorium, the mega-retailer withdrew its
application for an ILC charter in March of 2007."9
III. DODD-FRANK'S MARK ON ILCs
President Barack Obama signed Dodd-Frank into law on
July 21, 2010.9 Many regard the Act as the "most sweeping
financial regulatory reform in both scope and impact since the
Great Depression."91 Congress designed Dodd-Frank to increase
the government's capacity to minimize systemic risk to the
financial industry, oversee institutions that provide financial
services more thoroughly, and provide greater protections for
consumers.? Dodd-Frank rearranges the regulatory framework by
85. FEIN, supra note 25; Business Checking Account Freedom Act, H.R. 1224,
109th Cong. (2006).
86. See H.R. 1224; H.R. 1224: Business Checking Freedom Act of 2005,
GovTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bili.xpd?bill=hl09-1224 (last visited
Feb. 7, 2011).
87. See Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC Places Six-Month
Moratorium on Industrial Loan Company Applications and Notices (July 28, 2006),
available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2006/pr06073.html ("The FDIC put
the moratorium in place to provide time to assess developments in the ILC industry,
to determine if any emerging safety and soundness or policy issues exist[ed] involving
ILCs, and to evaluate whether statutory, regulatory or policy changes need[ed] to be
made in the oversight of these charters. The moratorium also allow[ed] the agency
time to further evaluate the various issues, facts and arguments raised in connection
with the ILC industry, and to assess whether statutory or regulatory changes or
revised standards and procedures for ILC applications and supervision . . . [were]
needed to protect the deposit insurance fund.").
88. Joe Adler, Cerberus Application May Renew ILC Tensions: Without
Moratorium, FDIC Appears Divided Along Old Fault Lines, AM. BANKER, June 10,
2010, available at 2008 WLNR 11822634 (Westlaw).
89. See Eric Dash, Wal-Mart Abandons Bank Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2007, at
C1.
90. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
91. Ropiequet et al., supra note 22, at 1.
92. Id.
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mandating both existing and newly-fashioned regulatory agencies
to conduct more than fifty studies relating to both the American
and global financial system.93 In addition, the Act directs these
regulatory agencies to draft, adopt, and implement more than 240
regulations, which will continue to alter the financial landscape for
94
many years.
Title VI of Dodd-Frank, entitled the Bank and Savings
Association Holding Company and Depository Institution
Regulatory Improvements Act of 2010, calls for several studies
concerning the risky activities of institutions Congress has
determined to be potential threats to the security of the financial
sector.95 Section 603 of Dodd-Frank orders the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) to institute a study investigating
whether Congress should discard current exceptions to the BHCA
and expand the definition of a "bank holding company" (BHC) to
encompass entities such as ILC holding companies.6 The GAO is
required to determine the types and number of companies that fall
within the scope of the exception and identify the "size, geographic
location, commercial affiliates, and their federal supervisor" of
each such company. 97 Section 603 also examines whether the
current regulatory scheme governing institutions excluded from
the BHCA is sufficient to prevent these institutions from placing
the financial system in significant systemic danger as well as the
possible consequences of subjecting these institutions to the same
restrictions required of banks.9 8
93. See Press Release, Howell Reeves & Kathleen A. Johnson, Duane Morris
LLP, U.S. Fin. Reform: Capital Requirements for Fin. Institutions (Aug. 24, 2010),
http://www.duanemorris.com/alerts/financial-reform-financialinstitutionrequireme
nts_3764.html.
94. ROBERT KURUCZA, GOODWIN PROCTOR LLP, THE DODD-FRANK WALL
STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 1 (2010),
http://www.goodwinprocter.com/-/rnedia/Files/Publications/Newsletters/Financial%2
OServices%20Alert/2010/doddfrank_7_28_2010_PDF.pdf.
95. Dodd-Frank Act § 603 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1815 note).
96. Id. § 603(b); see M. MAUREEN MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL
R41339, THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
ACT: TITLES III AND VI, REGULATION OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS AND
DEPOSITORY INSTITUTION HOLDING COMPANIES 6 (2010) [hereinafter MURPHY RL
R41339], available at http://www.1lsdc.orglattachments/files/225/CRS-R41339.pdf.
97. MURPHY RL R41339, supra note 96, at 6-7; Dodd-Frank Act § 603(b) (to be
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1815 note).
98. Dodd-Frank Act § 603(b) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1815 note); see also
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Section 603 of Dodd-Frank also establishes a three-year
moratorium preventing the FDIC from approving any deposit
insurance application for a "new credit card bank, industrial bank,
or trust bank or any application for change in control of any
existing institution of those types that . . . [would result in a]
'commercial firm' acquir[ing] control of the institution."99 Section
603 provides some exceptions to the change of control
prohibitions.'" The exceptions involve companies that are in
danger of defaulting, circumstances such as mergers or the full
acquisition of the commercial company, and a change in control
resulting from the acquisition of less than twenty-five percent of
voting stock in the commercial company that owns the excluded
entity. 0 In order to take advantage of these exceptions, however,
those involved in the acquisition must gain regulatory approval
prior to the acquisition.'0
Section 603 of Dodd-Frank prohibits Wal-Mart and other
commercial institutions currently seeking to establish or acquire an
ILC from moving forward with their objectives, unless they fall
within one of the three aforementioned exclusions.103  Even
assuming Wal-Mart places itself in the position to somehow exploit
one of these exceptions, the retailer would probably fail to obtain
approval from regulatory agencies that, prior to Congress's
moratorium, instituted their own moratorium preventing
commercial entities from acquiring an ILC as a direct result of the
MURPHY RL R41339, supra note 96, at 6 ("Among the exceptions that GAO is to
study are (1) state-chartered banks owned by thrift associations and limited to taking
deposits for thrift associations; (2) a bank controlled by a trust company or mutual
savings bank in the same state as of December 31, 1970, provided that, subject to an
exception for investments authorized for national banks, the trust company or mutual
savings bank does not acquire any interest in a company which would give it 5% of
the voting shares of the company; (3) institutions which function only in a trust or
fiduciary capacity, subject to certain activities restrictions; (4) credit card banks; (5)
industrial loan companies; and (6) savings associations.").
99. MURPHY RL R41339, supra note 96, at 6 (defining "commercial firm" as an
institution which gains eighty-five percent or more of its annual revenue from
operations a part from depository institution operations and other financial
activities).
100. Dodd-Frank Act § 603(a) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1815 note).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See MURPHY RL R41339, supra note 96, at 6.
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public scrutiny surrounding Wal-Mart's past attempts1'4 Section
603 of Dodd-Frank essentially prevents Wal-Mart from
establishing or acquiring an ILC or any alternative banking charter
through the summer of 2013.0
IV. WAL-MART'S THIRD WAY
Although Dodd-Frank and other previous congressional
and administrative actions have precluded Wal-Mart from gaining
a bank charter outright, Wal-Mart has adopted alternative means
to provide its customers with low-cost, efficient financial services
without a bank charter."0 Examples include the introduction of
various "MoneyCenters"' in many of Wal-Mart's nationwide
branches;'a the acquisition of a minority stake in Green Dot
Corporation (Green Dot),1 09 a prepaid card provider that services
many of Wal-Mart's customers;"o and $25,000 small business loans
offered by Sam's Club, a subsidiary of Wal-Mart."' When asked
about its banking aspirations in the past, Jane Thompson,
president of Wal-Mart's financial services division," 2 stated that
Wal-Mart wishes to offer banking services to "provide greater
efficiency, effectiveness and safety in Wal-Mart's interaction with
the payments systems . . . [and] nothing more."" 3 However, the
aforementioned actions suggest something more.
104. See FEIN,supra note 25.
105. See Dodd-Frank Act § 603(a) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1815 note).
106. See Financial Services on Aisle Nine: Wal-Mart Gives Banks a Run for Their
Money, supra note 10.
107. See infra Part IV.A (examining Wal-Mart's MoneyCenter operations).
108. Steve Bills, Wal-Mart's Bill Pay Sets Stage for a Finance Push, AM. BANKER,
Aug. 26, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 16585667 (Westlaw).
109. See infra Part IV.B (explaining Wal-Mart's partnership with Green Dot).
110. Maria Aspan, Wal-Mart Cuts Fees to Lure Banks' Clients, AM. BANKER, Feb.
19, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 3172207 (Westlaw).
111. Press Release, Sam's Club Tests Online Small Business Loan Program for
Main Street (July 6, 2010), available at http://www.prnewswire.cominews-
releases/sams-club-tests-online-small-business-loan-program-for-main-street-
97835989.html; see also Anna Gelpern, Wal-Mart Bank in Mexico: Money to the
Masses and the Home-host Hole, 39 CONN. L. REv. 1513, 1514 (2007) (discussing the
acquisition of a bank charter by Walmex, the Mexican division of Wal-Mart, which is
another example of Wal-Mart's attempts to build up its financial capacity).
112. Koslow, supra note 3 (observing that Wal-Mart's financial services unit was
established in 2002).
113. Engen, supra note 18 (quoting Jane Thompson's testimony regarding the
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A. Wal-Mart Money Centers
Wal-Mart MoneyCenters are dedicated spaces inside Wal-
Mart's stores that offer financial services, including check cashing,
money orders, bill payment, and money transfers, through
partnerships with financial companies, such as Green Dot,
MoneyGram International Inc., and Fiserv Inc., a financial
technology company.114 In September of 2004, Wal-Mart opened
its first MoneyCenter "as a way to consolidate the financial
services in one area of the store, improve customer traffic flows
[sic] and provide more privacy for customer transactions."11 5
Thompson stated that the "MoneyCenters . . . were specially
created to give customers a welcoming environment where they
can save when they cash checks, pay bills and transfer money." 116
As of March 16, 2010, there were MoneyCenters in more than
1,000 stores nationwide.'17
Thompson estimates that in a typical week, these
MoneyCenters process three to five million financial
transactions."" Wal-Mart MoneyCenters offer money transfers,
money orders, check-cashing services,"' and CheckFreePay walk-
in bill services. 120 The MoneyCenters also provide prepaid Visa
debit cards via Wal-Mart's partnership with Green Dot.121
According to Wal-Mart, customers that took advantage of the
MoneyCenters saved an estimated $450 million in 2009.
Perhaps, if Wal-Mart continues to establish MoneyCenters in its
motives behind Wal-Mart's application for an ILC during a 2006 hearing at the
FDIC).
114. Press Release, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Walmart Opens 1000th Walmart
MoneyCenter, Announces 500 More for 2010 (Mar. 16, 2010), available at
http://walmartstores.com/pressroom/news/9702.aspx; see Bills, supra note 108.
115. Koslow, supra note 3.
116. Id. (quoting Jane Thompson in a 2009 press release stating the goal of the
MoneyCenters).
117. Press Release, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., supra note 114.
118. Koslow, supra note 3.
119. Maria Aspan, No Charter? No Problem for Wal-Mart, AM. BANKER, Dec. 4,
2009 [hereinafter Aspan, No Problem for Wal-Mart], available at 2009 WLNR
22615057 (Westlaw).
120. Bills, supra note 108.
121. Koslow, supra note 3; see also infra Part IV.B (examining Wal-Mart's
partnership with Green Dot).
122. Koslow, supra note 3.
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stores, which it plans to do,"3 then the retailer's customers will
continue to save money using this financial alternative.
Wal-Mart MoneyCenters are an affordable means for
unbanked or underbanked individuals to access financial
services.124 Underbanked individuals, often described as "lower-
income individuals who live paycheck to paycheck and are too
poor to afford or even need sophisticated financial services,"
have been largely ignored by traditional banks that tend to target
"middle-class and affluent consumers." 126  The underbanked and
nonbanked could find cheaper alternatives to traditional banks by
using Wal-Mart MoneyCenters.17
B. Wal-Mart and Green Dot
Headquartered in Los Angeles, California, Green Dot is
America's leading prepaid card provider, issuing products such as
MasterCard- and Visa-branded prepaid reloadable debit cards."0
A prepaid debit card is the functional equivalent of a typical credit
or debit card, but prepaid users may utilize them only if there are
preloaded funds on the card.12 9  Generally, prepaid debits
providers, such as Green Dot, do not provide lines of credit to
their prepaid customers.' 0 Therefore, once a prepaid user depletes
123. See Press Release, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., supra note 114.
124. Engen, supra note 18; see also Lepro, supra note 1 (maintaining that within
the category of the underbanked are low-income people consisting of numerous
immigrants; individuals who have horrible credit or who are unsatisfied with their
banking arrangements; and young people inexperienced with banking).
125. Lepro, supra note 1 ("The prevailing definition [of the term "underbanked"]
has been: consumers who don't fully participate in mainstream financial services, who
may have a checking or savings account with a traditional bank and little else.").
126. Id.
127. See Engen, supra note 18. But see David Lazarus, Wal-Mart Deal is Better
than Check Cashers, S.F. CHRON., June 24, 2007, at C1, available at 2007 WLNR
11879197 (explaining that, at one point, Wal-Mart attempted to exclude itself from a
federal law prohibiting financial institutions from redlining, or denying financial
services or credit to people in low-income neighborhoods, but later abandoned those
efforts).
128. Corporate Profile, GREEN DOT CORP.,
http://ir.greendot.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=235286&p=irol-homeProfile&t=&id=& (last
visited Sept. 24, 2010).
129. See FAQs, GREEN DOT CORP.,
https://www.mygreendot.com/greendot/help#what (last visited Sept. 24, 2010).
130. See, e.g., id.
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the funds, she must reload the card or purchase a new prepaid
card, both of which can be done at various retail stores,' including
Wal-Mart.13 2  As of June 2010, 50,000 Wal-Mart locations sold
Green Dot prepaid cards.33
In 2007, Wal-Mart and Green Dot entered into a
partnership granting Green Dot access to Wal-Mart's prepaid card
business. m This partnership has resulted in an increased market
share in the prepaid debit industry for both parties.1' Access to
Wal-Mart's immense customer base facilitated a fifty percent
growth in Green Dot's Wal-Mart business between July 2009 and
March 2010, "accounting for [sixty-three percent] of Green Dot's
quarterly revenue.""' Green Dot's access to the American
consumer through Wal-Mart has been particularly beneficial for
Green Dot because it does not operate in any offices of its own.'37
Wal-Mart's benefit from this business relationship is also
significant.'38 First, Wal-Mart pays ninety percent of its 1.4 million
employees by directly depositing weekly paychecks onto prepaid
cards supplied by Green Dot.'3 9 Further, considering that two
million Wal-Mart customers used prepaid cards in 2009 and the
low cost of these prepaid cards,'1 Wal-Mart's partnership with
Green Dot could position the mega-retailer to increase its market
share in the growing prepaid debit business. 4 '
The importance of Green Dot's success to Wal-Mart was
made most evident when Wal-Mart acquired a minority ownership
131. See id.
132. MICHELLE JUN, CONSUMER FED'N OF AMERICA AND NAT'L LAW CTR.,
PREPAID CARDS: SECOND-TIER BANK ACCOUNT SUBSTITUTES 9 (2010), available at
http://www.defendyourdollars.org/Prepaid%20WP.pdf.
133. See Walmart Expands Card Presence with Equity Stake in Prepaid Provider





137. See John Adams, An FI by Any Other Name, BANK TECH. NEWS, Aug. 1,
2010, available at 2010 WLNR 15386340.
138. See Walmart Expands Card Presence with Equity Stake in Prepaid Provider
Green Dot, supra note 133.
139. Id.
140. Aspan, No Problem for Wal-Mart, supra note 119; see also Koslow, supra
note 3 (observing that as of April, 2010, Wal-Mart sold their prepaid cards for $3).
141. See Aspan, No Problem for Wal-Mart, supra note 119.
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stake in Green Dot in May 2010. Although the quantity of shares
was too little to give Wal-Mart substantial control over the prepaid
provider, the acquisition still raised questions as to Wal-Mart's
motives.142 The acquisition discomforted those within the financial
industry due in part to the fact that the announcement came some
months after Green Dot filed an application with the Fed to obtain
100 percent voting shares in Bonneville Bankcorp.143 If the Fed
approved the application, Green Dot would gain voting shares in
Bonneville Bank, a Utah-based, community bank, and become a
BHC.'" This would permit Green Dot to label its prepaid
products as bank accounts, presumably making them more
attractive.145 This is because the FDIC treats all funds underlying
stored value cards and other nontraditional access mechanisms,
including prepaid debit cards, as "'deposits' to the extent that the
funds have been placed at an insured depository institution."
Therefore, if Green Dot acquired or established a bank, then the
FDIC would treat each of its prepaid card users as FDIC-insured
depositors.147 Furthermore, according to one expert, Green Dot's
bank could "enable Wal-Mart to extend more automated point of
sale financial services such as payments or savings accounts."148
Others claim that the acquisition of the bank would permit Green
Dot to offer incremental amounts of credit, which would allow
Wal-Mart's customers to establish lines of credit at the retailer's
locations through Green Dot.4 9
142. See Adams, supra note 137.
143. See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Actions of the
Board, Its Staff, and the Federal Reserve Banks; Applications and Reports Received
No. 9 (Feb. 27, 2010), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/H2/20100227/h2.pdf.
144. See Walmart Expands Card Presence with Equity Stake in Prepaid Provider
Green Dot, supra note 133 ("Green Dot explicitly claims that it will use the bank to
push its cards and additional services, including savings accounts, on a pilot basis, to
its core customer base."); Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
supra note 143.
145. See Adams, supra note 137.
146. FDIC General Counsel's Opinion No. 8 Insurability of Funds Underlying
Stored Value Cards and Other Nontraditional Access Mechanisms, 73 Fed. Reg.
67,155, 67,157 (Nov. 13, 2008).
147. See id.
148. Adams, supra note 137 (quoting Beth Robertson, a director at Javelin
Research).
149. Id. (quoting Red Gillen, a senior analyst at Celent).
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Green Dot's acquisition or establishment of a bank would
not make Wal-Mart subject to regulation by the Fed as a BHC.
Green Dot only sold one percent of its voting securities to Wal-
Mart.so The BHCA defines a "bank holding company" as a
''company which has control over any bank or over any company
that is or becomes a bank holding company.""' Under the Act, a
company "has control" over a bank or BHC if: (1) it directly or
indirectly owns twenty-five percent or more of the voting shares of
any class of stock of the bank or BHC; (2) it controls in any
manner the election of a majority of the bank or BHC board of
directors or trustees; or (3) the Fed determines the company
directly or indirectly exercises a "controlling influence over
management or policies" of the bank or BHC.152 Moreover, the
Fed shall presume no control exists if the company owns less than
five percent of the voting securities in the bank or BHC."' Thus,
because Wal-Mart controls less than five percent of the voting
securities in Green Dot and Wal-Mart would not play a role in
managing the bank or the BHC,15 4 Wal-Mart would not constitute
a BHC under the BHCA if Green Dot were to establish or acquire
a bank. Wal-Mart would also not be subject to Fed oversight over
its nonbank activities.
Admittedly, significant dangers associated with prepaid
debit cards do exist."' However, Green Dot, Wal-Mart, and
Congress, could and should take steps to increase protections
afforded to prepaid customers."' For example, Green Dot and
Wal-Mart should make information regarding certain hidden
charges associated with its prepaid cards, such as out-of-network
150. Id.
151. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (2006).
152. Id.
153. See id. § 1841(a)(3).
154. Andrew Johnson, Green Dot: Wal-Mart Won't Have Bank Operating Role,
AM. BANKER, June 17, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 12249655 (Westlaw).
155. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6); Damian Paletta, Fed Rating Revamp Fuels Fears
of Turf War, AM. BANKER, Dec. 2, 2004 (noting that the Fed is a BHC's primary
regulator), available at 2004 WLNR 13586795 (Westlaw).
156. See generally Andrew Martin, Prepaid, but Not Prepared for Debit Card Fees,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2009, at Al (summarizing the evolution of prepaid cards, and
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withdrawal fees and replacement card fees, more accessible to
their customers. In addition, Congress should expand
protections contained in the Electronic Funds Transfer Act
(EFTA) 159 to encompass prepaid cards.16o This would afford
important error resolution rightst 6' as well as protections against
unauthorized use to prepaid card users.6 2
This being said, according to Consumers Union, a nonprofit
publisher of consumer reports, Wal-Mart does offer its prepaid
customers the most economical prepaid service among major
prepaid card providers.163 Wal-Mart also provides protections
against unauthorized use as well as error resolution rights that are
similar, although not as broad, to those afforded by the EFTA.164
Finally, Dodd-Frank does subject stored value cards to the
regulatory oversight of the Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection (BCFP). 6 Indeed, under section 1002 of the Act,
selling, providing, or issuing a stored value card is a financial
product or service, so the provider is subject to BCFP oversight.'6
The Act expressly includes prepaid debit cards within the
158. See JUN, supra note 132, at app. A.
159. Electronic Fund Transfers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (2006). Section 1022 of
Dodd-Frank transfers rulemaking authority under the EFTA to the BCFP. Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
1022, 124 Stat. 1376, 1980 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5512).
160. See JUN, supra note 132, at 14-15.
161. Id. at 15 (explaining that under the EFTA, if a debt or credit card consumer is
not afforded error resolution rights, missing funds must be replaced within a specified
period of time).
162. Id. at 14.
163. See id. at 11-13 (comparing fees associated with Wal-Mart's prepaid cards
with to fees associated with cards offered by other providers, and concluding that
Wal-Mart's prepaid cards were cheaper overall).
164. See id. at 15-16 (noting that Wal-Mart reserves the right to change or rescind
these rights and protections at any time and for any reason).
165. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 1002(15)(A)(v), 124 Stat. 1376, 1958 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §
5481) (defining products or services that subject institutions to BCFP oversight). The
purpose of the BCFP is to implement and enforce "[f]ederal consumer financial
law[s] consistently for the purpose of ensuring that all consumers have access to
markets for consumer financial products and services and that markets for consumer
financial products and services are fair, transparent, and competitive." Id. § 1021(a)
(to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5511).
166. Dodd-Frank Act § 1002(15)(A)(v) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5481); see
also id. § 1011 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491) (granting the BCFP regulatory
oversight over the offering and provision of products or services that are financial in
nature and targeted at consumers).
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definition of "stored value" cards.167  Hence, prepaid card
providers, including Green Dot, are subject to oversight by the
BCFP.
Some observers have viewed Wal-Mart's financial
partnership with Green Dot as a clear sign of Wal-Mart's
continued interest in providing financial services to its customers.
Green Dot's prepaid debit cards offer Wal-Mart's targeted
financial customers a low-cost, efficient alternative to traditional
debit and credit cards and their associated fees. 69 Underbanked
individuals unhappy with their present banking arrangements or
living "on a cash basis" increasingly find prepaid cards more
attractive than credit cards and debit cards. 70
V. CONGRESS SHOULD PERMIT WAL-MART TO ACQUIRE AN ILC
Banks play an important role in our society.17' As the
center of economy's payment system, banks have "constant
creditor-borrower relationships among themselves,"172 which
provides the primary mechanism used to build wealth. 173 But, it
also opens banks to potential losses and the dangers of preemptive
runs resulting from the actions of other banks. 74 In addition, their
combination of illiquid assets and liquid liabilities leave banks
vulnerable to bank runs," which significantly harm both banks
and unsophisticated depositors.' Congress has enacted special
constraints on banks and other financial institutions to ensure the
167. Dodd-Frank Act § 1002(28)(A) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5481).
168. See Adams, supra note 137 (speculating on the benefits of Wal-Mart's equity
stake in Green Dot).
169. See Aspan, supra note 110.
170. Financial Services on Aisle Nine: Wal-Mart Gives Banks a Run for Their
Money, supra note 10 (quoted language).
171. White, supra note 26, at 4.
172. Id.
173. See generally Raghuram G. Rajan, Why Banks Have a Future: Toward a New
Theory of Commercial Banking, 9 JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORP. FIN. 114 (1996)
(discussing two core banking activities: taking demand deposits and originating non-
marketable loans).
174. White, supra note 26, at 4.
175. Section 335 of Dodd-Frank is intended to prevent bank runs by increasing the
maximum deposit insurance amount from $100,000 to $250,000. See Dodd-Frank
Act, sec. 335, § 11(a)(1)(E) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(E)).
176. White, supra note 26, at 4-5.
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safety and soundness of these institutions.177 In an effort to limit
risk taking, these legislative and regulatory actions have, among
other things,78 limited the types of activities that banks and other
financial institutions, and their owners, can perform."'9 However,
as discussed in Part II.B,'80 Congress exempted ILCs from the
activities restrictions required of banks.'1' When Dodd-Frank's
moratorium expires in 2013, Congress should not eliminate the
ILC exception,'82 but continue excluding ILC holding companies
from nonbanking restrictions. Congress should also permit Wal-
Mart to establish or acquire an ILC because ample protections
against potentially risky transactions between any ILC and the
parent company already exist.'83
As with any FDIC-insured institution, there will be risks
associated with Wal-Mart's potential ILC, but current rules
governing inter-affiliate relationships and other restrictions on
ILCs would adequately minimize that risk.'" Although Wal-
Mart's retail activities would be free from regulatory oversight, the
FDIC's oversight authority over the potential ILC would be
undisputed.'8 ' Wal-Mart's ILC would need to comply with both
177. Id. at 5 (stating that keeping banks safe and sound requires banks to maintain
solvency, which requires ensuring that their assets remain greater than their
liabilities).
178. See id. at 6 ("At the heart of the safety-and-soundness regulation are four key
components: (a) minimum capital . . . requirements, to keep banks solvent; (b)
limitations on activities . .. ; (c) management competency requirements, to prevent
inadvertent insolvencies; and (d) in-the-field examiners and supervisors, to enforce
the rules.").
179. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (2006) (limiting banks to incidental powers that
are necessary to carry on the business of banking); 12 C.F.R. 225.21 (2008) (limiting
BHCs and BHC subsidiaries to activities that are closely related to banking); 12
U.S.C. § 1843(n)(1) (limiting financial holding companies to activities that are
financial in nature).
180. See supra Part II.B.
181. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(H); see also supra text accompanying notes 55-58
(describing the ILC exception to the definition of a "bank" under the BHCA).
182. The specific language in § 603(b) provides for a study to determine whether
Congress should eliminate the ILC exemption "in order to strengthen the safety and
soundness of institutions or the stability of the financial system." Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 603(b), 124 Stat.
1376,1598 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1815 note).
183. See White, supra note 26, at 7.
184. See ILC's Hearing, supra note 84, at 157-59 (statement of Douglas H. Jones,
Acting General Counsel, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation).
185. See id. at 78-79 (statement of Jim Matheson, Rep., U.S. House of
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state and federal regulatory controls that currently provide for the
1816safety and soundness of any such institution. For instance,
current regulatory requirements hold the senior management of
any FDIC-insured ILC responsible for ensuring that the ILC
complies with regulations.1' Additionally, the FDIC has
established measures that it may require of proposed ILCs that
will be "owned by or significantly involved in transactions with
commercial or financial companies."1" These include: (1)
establishing an independent board of directors; (2) maintaining
knowledgeable, experienced, and independent executive officers;
and (3) drafting a business plan tailored to the ILC's potentially
complex needs and unaffiliated with the parent.'89 Thirdly, ILCs
must abide by the requirements of section 23A and section 23B of
the Federal Reserve Act (FRA),'" which limit risks to an insured
depository institution, including an ILC,'9 from transactions with
its affiliates, including but not limited to its parent company.192
These two provisions also prevent ILCs from transferring to its
affiliates the "subsidy arising from the institution's access to the
Federal safety net."'" For example, if Wal-Mart or a Wal-Mart
subsidiary made poor credit decisions on loans, later found to pose
a significant risk of default,1 94 any purchase of those assets by the
ILC from Wal-Mart would be a covered transaction under sections
23A and 23B.'9' Therefore, section 23A would prohibit the ILC
Representatives).




190. Federal Reserve Act §§ 23A-23B, 12 U.S.C. § 371c (2006).
191. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(j); see also LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM,
REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL SERVICE AcriVITIES: CASES AND MATERIALS at
243-44 n. 47 (3d ed. 2008) ("Congress amended the Federal Deposit Insurance Act in
1966 to extend Section 23A to insured nonmember banks.").
192. 12 C.F.R. § 223.2(a)(1) (2008) (defining an affiliate to include parent
companies, which are companies that control a bank).
193. Application of Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act to
Derivative Transactions With Affiliates and Intraday Extensions of Credit to
Affiliates, 66 Fed. Reg. 24,229, 24,230 (May 11, 2001) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
250).
194. See Kevin K. Nolan, Note and Comment, Wal-Mart's Industrial Loan
Company: The Risk to Community Banks, 10 N.C. BANKING INST. 187,206 (2006).
195. See 12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(3)(B)(7).
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from buying the bad assets because section 23A bars ILCs from
purchasing low-quality assets from any affiliate.'% Moreover,
section 23B prohibits ILCs from entering into a transaction with
an affiliate that is not an arm's length transaction or better from
the perspective of the bank.'9" Also, pursuant to section 10(b) of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA) the FDIC has the
authority to examine any affiliate of the institution, including the
parent company, for purposes of determining (i) "the relationship
between [the] depository institution and any such affiliate" and (ii)
the "effect of such relationship on the depository institution. "'98
Pursuant to section 10(c) of the FDIA, "individuals, corporations,
partnerships, or other entities that in any way affect the
institution's affairs or ownership may be subpoenaed and required
to produce documents."'9 Finally, the ILC would be subject to
consumer protection regulations as well.2m0 These rules and
regulations require ILCs to organize their management in a
manner that creates an autonomous and self-reliant institution.2 01
The rules also ensure that ILCs are placed under the same
limitations required of traditional financial institutions; thus,
preventing significant unfair competitive advantages in favor of
Wal-Mart.20
There are also specific standards that ILCs must satisfy to
receive Federal deposit insurance. Principally, section 6 of the
FDIA requires the FDIC to assess the financial history and
condition of the ILC, the adequacy of its capital structure, its
future earnings prospects, the character of its management, the
convenience and needs of its community, and the degree to which
its corporate powers are consistent with the purposes of the
196. Id. § 371c(a)(3). A low-quality asset is defined as an asset (1) that is classified
as "substandard", "doubtful", or "loss"; (2) that is in a nonaccrual status; (3) that has
principal or interest payments that are more than thirty days overdue; or (4) whose
terms have been renegotiated or compromised as a result of the deteriorating
financial condition of the obligor. Id. § 371c(b)(10).
197. 12 U.S.C. § 371c.
198. Federal Deposit Insurance Act § 10(b), 12 U.S.C. § 1820(b).
199. West, supra note 56; Id. § 10(c), 12 U.S.C. § 1820(c).
200. ILC's Hearing, supra note 84, at 157 (statement of Douglas H. Jones, Acting
General Counsel, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation).
201. Id. at 158-59.
202. See supra notes 187-201 and accompanying text.
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FDIA.203 "The FDIC generally follows the same review process
for applications for deposit insurance ... relative to ILCs as it does
for such requests from other applicants," 204 and the agency will
deny Federal insurance to ILCs that pose unacceptable risks to the
Federal deposit insurance fund even if the ILC is eligible for
Federal deposit insurance.205
The FDIC also has some robust enforcement powers,
including the ability to prohibit an ILC from carrying out activities
with its parent company that have the potential to put the ILC and
the FDIC financial safety net in jeopardy.6 Included in this power
is the ability to "provide reimbursement, indemnification, or
guarantee against loss; dispose of any asset involved; rescind
agreements or contracts; [and to] take such other action as the
agency determines to be appropriate," including but not limited to
a complete divestiture. 207 Under the Prompt Corrective Action
provisions of the FDIA, if the FDIC finds that the ILC is
significantly undercapitalized, the FDIC may order affirmative
remedies, including dismissing the executive officers and directors
as well as the divesture by the parent company.2" If the FDIC
found that Wal-Mart was utilizing the ILC in a manner that was
inconsistent with safe and sound practices, the powers discussed 2W
would give the FDIC ample authority to stabilize the ILC and
enforce current banking laws and regulations.2 10
203. Federal Deposit Insurance Act § 6, 12 U.S.C. § 1816.
204. ILC's Hearing, supra note 84, at 161 (statement of Douglas H. Jones, Acting
General Counsel, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation).
205. See Federal Deposit Insurance Act § 5, 12 U.S.C. § 1815(a)(5) ("If the Board
of Directors votes to deny any application for insurance by any depository institution,
the Board of Directors shall promptly notify the appropriate Federal banking agency
and, in the case of any State depository institution, the appropriate State banking
supervisor of the denial of such application, giving specific reasons in writing for the
Board of Directors' determination with reference to the factors described in section
1816 of this title.").
206. See ILC's Hearing, supra note 84, at 159-61 (statement of Douglas H. Jones,
Acting General Counsel, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation).
207. Id. at 160
208. 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(f)(2)(I).
209. See supra text accompanying notes 206-208.
210. See ILC's Hearing, supra note 84, at 157-61 (statement of Douglas H. Jones,
Acting General Counsel, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation).
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As the top company on Fortune's Global 500 list in 2010
and with sales in excess of $405 billion,2 11 Wal-Mart is clearly a
well-capitalized company that is unlikely to collapse and place an
212FDIC-insured ILC in danger. Moreover, if an institution of Wal-
Mart's magnitude acquired an ILC, the FDIC would surely utilize
its supervisory and enforcement powers to ensure that such an
institution would not threaten the stability of the ILC. Some argue
that a top-down "consolidated supervision" approach would be
necessary to promote the safety and soundness of any ILC, which
213
is not possible with the bottom-up scheme currently in place.
But, this would require close monitoring and supervision over the
parent company's commercial activities even when there is no
investigation involving the ILC.214 As a result, financial regulators
would often be pulled into the business of overseeing commercial
activities, a function outside the scope of their expertise and
purpose.215 Nevertheless, if Congress determines that the Federal
government does not have the necessary tools to adequately
supervise ILCs and their holding companies, "then enacting
legislation to provide the regulators with the necessary authority
and/or the resources to develop the needed capabilities is the best
response - rather than to prevent these potentially productive
ownership arrangements." 2 16
For example, Congress could delegate greater authority to
the Financial Stability Oversight Counsel (FSOC) to designate a
nonbanking parent company of an ILC a systemically significant
211. Brian O'Keefe, Meet the CEO of the Biggest Company on Earth: Wal-Mart's
Mike Duke. Will His Colossal Company Be the First to Hit $500 Billion in Sales?,
FORTUNE, Sept. 27, 2010, at 80, 84.
212. Id. Section 38A of Dodd-Frank would require Wal-Mart to use its financial
stability as a source of financial strength for the ILC. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 38A, 124 Stat. 1376,
1616 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 18310-1).
213. See ILC's Hearing, supra note 84, at 117-26 (statement of Rick Hillman,
Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment, U.S. Government
Accountability Office).
214. See id. at 23.
215. See White, supra note 26, at 33.
216. White, supra note 26, at 12 (arguing that if regulators monitor a bank closely,
determine a transaction between the parent and the bank to be at arm's-length, and
severely penalize violations of banking laws, then Congress should permit bank
owners to carry out nonbanking activities).
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nonbank financial company under section 113 of Dodd-Frank,
which in turn, would subject the company to Fed oversight under
section 115 of the Act. This would, perhaps, deter Wal-Mart from
drastically growing its financial capabilities once it established or
acquired an ILC. The FSOC,217 established in section 989E of
Dodd-Frank, is responsible for identifying systemically significant
financial institutions, including systemically significant nonbank
218financial companies. The FSOC may designate a nonbank
institution a systemically significant financial institution if eighty-
five percent of the company's consolidated revenue or assets
derive from activities that are financial in nature. 21 9  This
designation requires a supermajority vote as well as an affirmative
vote by the Secretary of the Treasury.2 20 Once a company is
designated a systemically significant nonbank financial company, it
is subject to Fed registration, reporting, examination, and
enforcement requirements.22 1 Such a company would also be
subject to heightened prudential standards, including heightened
capital, leverage, and liquidity requirements 222 as well as periodic
stress testing.223 If Wal-Mart established or acquired an ILC, it
would not be susceptible to FSOC designation as a systemically
significant nonbank financial company because too few of its
* ** 224
consolidated revenue or assets derive from financial activities.
However, Congress could reduce the percentage of revenue
requirements for institutions that own ILCs. This would serve as a
deterrent preventing Wal-Mart from developing into a
predominately-financial institution. In addition, this would
provide the Fed with the authority and tools necessary to more
swiftly and directly manage a large, Wal-Mart-like company that
poses a systemic risk to the financial industry due to its ILC
217. See Dodd-Frank Act § 989E (to be codified as 12 U.S.C. app. 11).
218. Id. § 113 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5323).
219. Id. § 102 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5511).
220. Id. § 113 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5323).
221. Id. § 115 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5325).
222. Id.
223. Dodd-Frank Act § 165(i) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365).
224. See id. § 102 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5511); O'Keefe, supra note 211
(illustrating the magnitude of Wal-Mart's global retail operations).
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*225activities.
Wal-Mart's banking activities would have a substantial
effect on community banks and others in the financial sector.226
Opponents of Wal-Mart's ILC often point to local, mom-and-pop
merchants, driven out of business by Wal-Mart because of their
inability to compete with the mega-retailer's volume discount
pricing strategy,227 as an example of what could happen to
community-based banks if Congress permits Wal-Mart to acquire
or establish an ILC.22 These individuals argue that Wal-Mart
would drive out community banks or credit unions in communities
where Wal-Mart offers financial services, and as a result, reduce
competition, eliminate jobs, and export deposits out of local
communities.229 Accordingly, as Wal-Mart gained a greater share
of local financial markets, it could raise prices, and competitors
would have difficulty entering the market and undercutting Wal-
Mart due to the relatively high barriers to entry in banking.2 3 0
Community banks, however, presently face a similar threat
from large financial institutions carrying on banking and
commercial activities through affiliates due to the GLBA, yet
many continue to do business.21 Furthermore, community banks
made similar arguments against permitting an expansion of
permissible nonbanking activities for holding companies under the
BHCA prior to the enactment of the GLBA, yet the advent of
225. Alan W. Avery et al., Dodd-Frank Act Attempts to Curtail Systemic Risk, 127
BANKING L. J. 766, 776-77 (Sept. 2010).
226. Oral Testimony of Terry J. Jorde, Chairman, Indep. Cmty. Bankers of
America, Proposed Wal-Mart Bank's Application For Federal Deposit Insurance:
Hearing Before the Federal Deposit Insurance (Apr. 10, 2006) [hereinafter Oral
Testimony of Terry J. Jorde],
http://www.icba.org/files/ICBASites/PDFs/test041006oral.pdf.
227. Anthony Bianco & Wendy Zellner, Is Wal-Mart Too Powerful?, Bus. WK.,
Oct. 6,2003.
228. Oral Testimony of Terry J. Jorde, supra note 226.
229. Nolan, supra note 194, at 196-97.
230. Id. at 194, 197 ("Wal-Mart has shown a pattern of entering local communities
and using competitive pricing and other techniques to reduce local competition.
Once local competition has diminished or has been eliminated altogether, Wal-Mart
often raises its prices or sometimes shuts down its stores in order to open larger
regional stores.").
231. See Kline, supra note 43 (stating that community banks generally recognized
that the GLBA would open up banking to commerce by allowing more banks,
insurers, and brokerage houses into each other's businesses).
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financial holding companies did not send a large number of
community banks and credit unions into insolvency.232 Similarly,
Wal-Mart ILC would not push a significant number of community
banks out of business, but instead, would offer beneficial financial
23services to many unbanked and underbanked consumers.
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress should permit Wal-Mart to establish an ILC to
facilitate greater access to financial services by the unbanked and
underbanked. The benefits to underserved financial customers as
well as to those not currently participating in the financial sector
would be tremendous.234 Moreover, there exists substantial
examination, compliance and supervisory safeguards against the
risk of harm from a Wal-Mart-owned ILC.235  The sheer size of
Wal-Mart "combined with a bank charter could make Wal-Mart a
force to be reckoned with for traditional banks,"236 and, perhaps,
provide a competitive spark that would push traditional banking
companies to provide financial services for those currently
underserved or without banking services.
Modern financial legislation authorizing financial
institutions to carry on commercial activities through their
affiliates demonstrates how the wall between banking and
commerce continues to crumble. 237  Through these enactments,
232. See Douglas V. Austin, Can Community Banks Compete with Financial
Holding Companies?, MICH. BANKER, Sept. 1, 2000, available at 2000 WLNR
7405781; Douglas V. Austin, GLBA: Is It The Death of The Community Bank?,
HOOSIER BANKER, May 31, 2000, available at 2000 WLNR 4318733 (discussing why
community banks believed they would get out-competed by financial holding
companies).
233. See supra notes 1-16, 124-27, 169-70 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 1-24, 124-27, 169-70 and accompanying text.
235. See supra Part V.
236. Financial Services on Aisle Nine: Wal-Mart Gives Banks a Run for Their
Money, supra note 10 (quoting Stephen J Hoch, a Wharton marketing professor and
director of the Baker Retailing Initiative).
237. See Kline, supra note 43. For example, the GLBA allows banks, through
their financial subsidiaries, to purchase equity stakes in exclusively commercial
companies for investment purposes. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (2006) (permitting
the buying and selling of equity stakes as long as it is for investment purposes and the
bank does not routinely get involved in managing the company in which the
investment is made, except as necessary to obtain a reasonable return). A bank's
financial subsidiary may also carry out activities generally perceived to be
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Congress has shown its willingness to overlook the traditional
238
practice of separating banking and commerce. Congress should
not use this outdated justification to eliminate the ILC exception.
Instead, Congress should continue permitting commercial entities
to acquire or establish ILCs because such institutions do not pose a
significant risk to the safety and soundness of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Fund. If Congress believes that the government should
increase supervision over ILC parent companies, then it should
delegate the necessary authority to the FDIC or the Fed, rather
than eliminate the exception altogether2 9
CHARLES KABUGO-MUSOKE
commercial, including real estate brokerage and operating a travel agency because
such actions are considered "financial in nature" as defined by the GLBA. 12 U.S.C.
§ 2 4a; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4) (listing activities that are financial in nature).
238. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
239. White, supra note 26, at 12.
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